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retailer. For example, some have suggested that the success of the shopping center indicates the future of downtown redevelopment. 7 If unchecked, it would seem that the veto power could be forming the blueprint
of retail competition in both suburban shopping center and downtown
areas. Through an unrivalled system of highways, crossovers, and cloverleafs, the regional shopping center is becoming more than just a place to
buy and sell. Already there are reports of shopping centers that are satellite urban centers themselves, with plans including the construction of
community recreational and cultural centers and housing for up to 12,000
people. 72 Confronted with these possibilities, the veto power assumes an
entirely new perspective as the shopping center takes on new dimensions
in both the retail and social communities. Thus, the reevaluation must
consider not only present day perspective, but future implications as well.
That such a reevaluation is imminent seems clear, and it would not seem
unwarranted to conclude that the veto power in regional shopping centers
will not endure.
JAMES

F.

PASCAL

ADVERTISING AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
For over two decades the duty of radio and television broadcasters to
present balanced and fair coverage of controversial issues has been known
as the fairness doctrine. The origins of the duty, however, go back to the
early days of radio when limited frequencies and numerous stations made
for chaotic conditions.' To remedy the situation, Congress passed the
Radio Act of 1927,2 establishing the Federal Radio Commission3 as the
agency which was to regulate broadcasting.' Station licenses were issued
pursuant to the "public convenience, interest or necessity." Shortly after

7

See N. OWNINGS, THE AMERICAN AESTHETIC 129 (1969).

2

Bus. WEEK, Sept. 4, 1971, at 36.

'For a discussion of these conditions see NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-17
(1943).
2
Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934).
3
1d. § 3.
d. § 4.
5
1d. § 9.
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the passage of the Act, the Commission asserted that the "public interest"

required "free and fair competition of opposing views" and that this
principle applied "to all discussions of issues of importance to the pub-

lic." '6 This "public interest" obligation was carried over into the Communications Act of 19347 and was used by the Federal Communications

Commission to provide the foundation for the fairness doctrine as formulated in 1949.8 The doctrine requires, inter alia, that if one side of a

controversial issue has been raised during a broadcast, the licensee has the
responsibility of making sure the contrasting viewpoint receives fair coverage?
The fairness doctrine has recently come under great strain due to the

difficulties encountered by the FCC in defining controversial issues and
in deciding if coverage has been fair. 0 These difficulties can be traced in
large part to the FCC decision in Applicability of the FairnessDoctrine
to CigaretteAdvertising" which was subsequently affirmed by the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Banzhaf v. FCC.2 Cigarette
Advertising held that the advertising of cigarettes inherently raised a sig-

nificant issue of controversy. As a result, radio and television stations
which carried cigarette advertising

3

were required to devote a substantial

amount of broadcast time to presenting the case against smoking. 4
Since its affirmance of the FCC ruling in Banzhaf, the D.C. Circuit

has opened up the possibility in Friends of the Earth v. FCC 5 that con-

troversial issues can be implied in other commercial advertisements. In
addition, the same court in Business Executives' Move for Vietnam
'Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969), citing Great Lakes
Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993
(D.C. Cir.), petitionfor cert. dismissed,281 U.S. 706 (1930).
747 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
sEditorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). For a concise but comprehensive history of the fairness doctrine, see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 375-86 (1969).
'Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
"0 See The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest
Standards of the Communications Act, Notice of Inquiry, 30 F.C.C.2d 26 (1971).
19 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967). In this opinion the FCC affirmed its earlier ruling in Television
Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967) and gave a more elaborate explanation of the
reasons for its action.
12405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
3
' Since January 1, 1971, cigarette commercials have not been allowed on radio or TV.
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
"Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine to Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 942
(1967).
"5Friends of the Earth v. FCC, no. 24,556 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 16, 1971), rev'g Letter to
Gary Soucie, 24 F.C.C.2d 743 (1970).
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6
Peace"
seemed to indicate that due to the powerful impact of such advertising, the use of spot editorial advertisements might be necessary to give
the opposing viewpoint full, balanced, and fair coverage.
Broadcaster have shown some concern over these recent decisions
which, they maintain, will involve the government much too deeply in
daily programming operations. 17 This possible extension of the fairness
doctrine has been under review by Senator Sam Erwin's Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. Testimony has ranged from CBS
newsman Walter Cronkite's denunciation of government censorship
through expanded regulation of broadcasting 18 to George Washington
University Professor Jerome Barron's view that some government control
of broadcasting is necessary in order that important controversial views
be heard: "Censorship is no less censorship if it is in private hands
'19

THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IN GENERAL

In 1959 Congress amended section 315 of the Communications Act
of 193420 and in so doing provided a statutory framework for the fairness
doctrine. 21 That section was originally enacted to insure that broadcast
time made available to any legally qualified candidate for public office be
made equally available to legally qualified opponents. 22 The amendment
of 1959 exempted appearancesof the candidates on bona fide news programs from the operation of this "equal time" provision but added the
following language:
Nothing in the foregoing . ..shall be construed as relieving
broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts,
news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of
news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this
chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable
opportunity jbr the discussion of conflicting views on issues of
public importance.23
6
Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, no. 24,492 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3,
197 1), rev'g 25 F.C.C.2d 242 and Democratic National Committee, 25 F.C.C.2d 216 (1970).
"TSee BROADCASTING, Oct. 25, 197 1, at 42. BROADCASTING is one of the most important
trade magazines for broadcasters.
16Washington Post, Oct. 1, 197 1, at A 12, col. 5.
19 d.
2Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557, amending 47 U.S.C.
§ 315 (1958) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970)).
2
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969).
22Id.

2347 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
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Although the term "fairness doctrine" appears nowhere in the amended
section, the legislative history specifies that the above language was added
as "a restatement of the basic policy of the 'standard of fairness'
imposed on broadcasters under the Communications Act of 1934." z
The fairness doctrine withstood a constitutional challenge in Red Lion
BroadcastingCo. v. FCC.21 The case involved a specific application of the
26
doctrine by the FCC in promulgating certain "personal attack" rules.
These rules required in part that the broadcaster provide reasonable response time to an individual or group whose "honesty, character, integrity
or like personal qualities" had been attacked during the course of certain
programs.27 In upholding the constitutionality of this limitation of broadcasters' free speech, the Court emphasized the paramount right of viewers
and listeners
to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment . . .It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government
itself or a private licensee.28
The Court cautioned, however, that since the issue at hand was a narrow
one, it need not ratify every past or future fairness doctrine decision by
29
the FCC.
Thus the fairness doctrine finds support in both the Constitution and
federal statutory form. But neither the first amendment nor the statute
outlines any specific fairness requirements. The first real attempt to define
these requirements was made by the FCC in a 1949 report, Editorializing
by Broadcast Licensees,30 which was issued after the FCC had held hearings to inquire into the obligations of broadcast licensees with respect to
their treatment over the air waves of news, commentary and opinion.31
The discussion in the hearings and in the report centered on the relationship between the licensee's own editorializing and his public interest obligation to insure that all sides of controversial issues were fairly presented
32
over his facilities.
24

H.R. Rep. No. 1069, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959).
-395 U.S. 367 (1969).
2947 C.F.R. § 73.679 (1971).
2lhe broadcaster is required to notify the person attacked, send him a script or summary of the broadcast and offer him a reasonable opportunity to respond over the broadcast
facilities. 47 C.F.R. § 73.679(a) (1971). For a list of the exempt programs see 47 C.F.R.

§ 73.679(b) (1971).
21395 U.S. at 390.
29d. at 396.

-13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).

31

1d.
=Id.
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A broadcaster could not be deemed a "common carrier"' and thus
be forced to accept all requests for broadcast time.34 On the other hand,
since the available broadcast frequencies constituted a scarce and important resource' 3 the broadcaster was not the owner 31 thereof but a trustee
for the public at large.3 7 An important aspect of this relationship, according to the Commission, was the fact that the broadcaster, in order to fulfill
his duty as a trustee, needed to make various opinions and views available
to the general public for their "consideration and acceptance or rejection. 113 Thus the broadcaster, in choosing between the various individuals
desiring access to the medium, had to refrain from acting only in his own
self-interest. A prerequisite for his license from the FCC was that the
39
public interest, convenience or necessity be thereby served.
In its 1949 formulation, the Commission further decided that the
licensee could in fact air his own editorial opinions within reasonable
limits suggested by the general requirements of fairness." But the fairness
requirements involved an active and affirmative effort on the part of the
licensee "to afford a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of all
responsible positions on matters of sufficient importance .
,"It was
4.
to be left up to the licensee to exercise his own best judgment and good
sense in determining the subjects, the particular format of the programs,
the different shades of opinion to be presented, and the spokesman for
42
each point of view.
The FCC made another attempt in 1964 to define fairness standards
and controversial issues of public importance. In Applicability of the
Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public
Importance 3 [hereinafter cited as Fairness Primer]representative rulings
were set forth to give the broadcasters a sensitivity for the types of issues
"Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1970) reads in part: "[A] person
engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a
common carrier."
3Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1247 (1949).
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969).
3
1Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970) reads in part:
It is the purpose of this chapter. . . to maintain the control of the United
States over all the channels of interstate and foreign radio transmission;
and to provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof.
(emphasis added)
3Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1247, 1258 (1949).
31d. at 1247.
3
11d. at 1248.
0
Id.at 1252-53.
41
1d. at 1250.
121d.at 1251.
-40 F.C.C. 598 (1964).
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which might require balanced coverage. Controversial issues included

such topics as fair employment, pay TV, the nuclear weapons test ban

treaty, and effective methods of combating communism. 44
According to the FairnessPrimer,the keystone of the fairness doctrine
was the right of the public to be informed and this necessitated coverage

of all major issues, national as well as local. 45 Furthermore, the licensee
had an affirmative, non-delegable duty to encourage and search out contrasting viewpoints." Neither sufficient coverage of a topic by other media
such as newspapers 4 nor lack of sponsorship48 would excuse failure to

present balanced coverage of opposing views.49 However, the licensee still
retained his usual discretion in deciding the amount of time5" to be given
as well as the appropriate spokesmen and program format. 5'
CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES INHERENT IN ADVERTISING

I. Implicit Issues
In determining whether or not a controversial issue has been raised in
a program, the FCC has generally looked only to the obvious issue or the

issue directly raised. 52 The Commission has been reluctant to probe beneath the surface of a broadcast for other issues, emphasizing that if every
statement or inference could be the subject of a separate fairness requirement, the result would be excessive government intervention in broadcast

journalism.5
Upon occasion, however, the FCC has approached a broader definition of a controversial issue of public importance. For instance, in
Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, the Commission stated that an

issue or a program need not be obviously controversial from the start, but
that the opposition and debate could become manifest at a later time. 5
"Id. at 600-04.
41ld. at 604.
JId. at 604-05.

"Id. at 605-06.
sId. at 609; Letter to Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963). In this letter,
the FCC informed a licensee that when he has broadcast a program which raises a significant
controversial issue and has been unable to obtain paid sponsorship for an appropriate
contrasting view, he cannot reject an otherwise suitable presentation on the grounds of lack
of sponsorship. In other words, such situations would require the station to bear the cost.
"140 F.C.C. at 607-09.
""Equal time" is required only with respect to legally qualified candidates and "personal attacks." See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Applicability
of the Fairness Doctrine to Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967).
540 F.C.C. at 606-09.
52See National Broadcasting Co., 25 F.C.C.2d 735 (1970).
5Id. at 736-37.
m13 F.C.C. at 1251.
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In addition, the Commission in the Fairness Primer listed among the
representative rulings an earlier decision which stated that the substance
of a broadcast could very well raise a controversial issue, i.e., the discussion of water fluoridation during an otherwise innocuous program on
health and nutrition. 55
The Commission seemed to place a very liberal interpretation on what
issues would require fairness doctrine treatment in a 1963 public notice:
In determining compliance with the fairness doctrine the Commission looks to substance rather than to label or form. It is immaterial whether a particular program or viewpoint is presented under
the label of "Americanism," "anti-communism" or "states'
rights," or whether it is a paid announcement, official speech,
editorial or religious broadcast. Regardless of label or form, if one
viewpoint of a controversial issue is presented, the licensee is obligated to make a reasonable effort to present the other opposing
viewpoint or viewpoints.56
57
As early as 1946 the FCC considered in Petition of Sam Morris
whether a controversial issue could be implicit in a commercial advertisement. The complaint, involving an attempt by the National Temperance
and Prohibition Council to block the license renewal of a radio station,
stated that the broadcasters had been selling choice advertising time to
those "counseling the drinking of alcoholic liquors," but had refused to
sell any time whatever to those who wanted to preach abstinence.5" Since
the issues were large and the advertising practice in question widespread,
the Commission refused to take any action against the single station.
It is interesting to note, however, that the Commission, in dismissing
the petition, rejected the station owner's contention that the advertising
of commercial goods and services could not be controversial." The Commission stated that what for some individuals was "merely a routine
advertising 'plug' extolling the virtues of a beverage . . .[was for other]
individuals the advocacy of a practice which they deemed to be detrimen60
tal to our society.1

II. Banzhaf
As mentioned above, the FCC in Cigarette Advertising held that a
140 F.C.C. at 603; Report on "Living Should Be Fun" Inquiry, 33 F.C.C. 101 (1962).
Controversial Issue Programming, 40 F.C.C. 571, 572 (1963) (emphasis added).
S1 I F.C.C. 197 (1946).
5

"Id. at 197.
5
11d. at 198.
"Id.
at 199.

NOTES
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controversial issue of public importance was inherent in the advertising
of cigarettes and thus required the broadcasters to present programs with
the anti-smoking viewpoint. 61 This was the first time since PetitionofSam
Morris that the fairness doctrine was regarded as relevant to commercial
advertising. 2 It is important to note several additional aspects of the
CigaretteAdvertising ruling. The Commission maintained that'the controversial issue raised was the desirability of smoking in light of an extreme health hazard; the issue was not the health hazard itself.63 In addition, this issue was implicit in the advertisements, not having been posed
directly by the advertiser. 64
The Commission stressed that this obligation to present anti-smoking
programs stemmed from the broadcaster's duty to operate in the public
interest and not from any esoteric requirements of the fairness doctrine.65
The public interest meant nothing, the Commission asserted, if it did not
include the responsibility of informing the public of health hazards. 66 This
public interest basis of the ruling was in turn supported by two key factors: (I) governmental and private reports, e.g., the 1964 Report of the
Surgeon General's Advisory Committee, 6 as well as congressional action,
e.g., the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965;6s and
(2) their common assertion that "normal use of. . . [cigarettes] can be
a hazard to the health of millions of persons." 69
Another important aspect of the ruling in CigaretteAdvertising was
the recognition by the FCC of the unique position of advertising with
respect to the question of whether the licensee has presented fair coverage
to both sides of an issue. Since cigarette spot advertisements were numerous, repetitive and continuous, 0 balanced presentation required more than
just "an occasional program a few times a year or. . . some appropriate
announcements once or twice a week." 71 But the FCC was adamant in
619 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967).

"2Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1092 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
842 (1969).
19 F.C.C.2d at 927, 939.
"Id. at 938. The portrayal of smoking as desirable was an issue because of the tremendous health hazard involved. The issue of health had also been raised, despite the absence
of any specific health guarantees, through minimizing the risk involved in smoking, i.e., the
mention in the advertisements of improved and recessed filters. Id. at 939 n.18.
"Id. at 949.
661d.
67
1d. at 95 1.

6s15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (Supp. 111 1968).
119 F.C.C.2d at 943.
70
71

d. at 941.
d. at 942.
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its assertion that since cigarette advertising presented a unique situation,
72
the ruling was not to be extended to other commercial advertising.
In Banzhafv. FCC,73 the D.C. Circuit affirmed the CigaretteAdvertising ruling and attempted to narrow the holding even more by placing
greater emphasis on the relationship between the public interest and the
public health. According to the court, the cigarette ruling was an exten74
sion of the fairness doctrine and an independent public interest ruling.
As such it required independent support. 75 The public interest indisputably
included the public health, which was itself a type of basic law, "both
justifying new extensions of old powers and evoking legitimate concern of
government wherever its regulatory power otherwise extends.1 76 And the
public health was certainly at stake, since normal use rather than abuse77
of cigarettes endangered the lives of a substantial body of the population.
Furthermore, the danger had been thoroughly documented and Congress
7
had taken action to warn the public.
III.

Chevron and Esso

Despite the Commission's warning that it would not extend the cigarette ruling to product advertising generally, 79 it softened this view in two
recent advertising rulings. The complaint in Alan F. Neckritz 0
[hereinafter cited as Chevron] stated that certain gasoline commercials
had raised two controversial issues: (1)whether a gasoline additive would
help solve the air pollution problem and (2) whether the advertisements
72d.

at 942-43.

-405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
7
"Id. at 1096.
75
d.
7
Id. at 1096-97.
id. at 1097.
7
See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra. The court concluded:
Thus, as a public health measure addressed to a unique danger authenticated by official and congressional action, the cigarette ruling is not invalid
on account of its unusual particularity. It is in fact the product singled out
for special treatment which justifies the action taken. In view of the potentially grave consequences of a decision to continue-or above all to startsmoking, we think it was not an abuse of discretion for the Commission
to attempt to insure not only that the negative view be heard, but that it
be heard repeatedly. The Commission has made no effort to dictate the
content o(the required anti-cigarette broadcasts. It has emphasized that
the responsibility for content, source, specific volume, and the precise
timing rests with the good faith of the licensee.
405 F.2d at 1099.
119 F.C.C.2d at 942-43.
8029
F.C.C.2d 807 (1971).
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had themselves become controversial in light of the filing of a Federal
Trade Commission complaint against the advertisements and the sponsor's rebuttal thereto.81 In declining to take any action on the complaint,
the Commission pointed out that the advertisements had not raised the
issue of air pollution but had instead advanced a claim for product effi-2
cacy which was not in itself a controversial issue of public importance.
With regard to the FTC complaint, the Commission felt it would be
improper to intrude on the FTC's primary jurisdiction.83
Thus the Commission did not think it would serve the purposes of the
fairness doctrine to apply it to claims of a product's efficacy or social
utility.u However, with reference to the applicability of the doctrine generally, the Commission noted that in some situations product commercials
would raise controversial issues:
For example, if an announcement sponsored by a coal-mining
company asserted that strip mining had no harmful ecological
results, the sponsor would be engaging directly in debate on a
controversial issue, and fairness obligations would ensue. Or, if a
community were in dispute over closing a factory emitting noxious
fumes and an advertisement for a product made in the factory
argued that question, fairness would also come into play.
In Wilderness Society" [hereinafter cited as Esso] the Commission
sustained a fairness complaint which concerned institutional advertising
primarily designed, according to the sponsor, to create good will. 1 The
messages spoke of the investment the oil company was making on the
North Slope of Alaska in order to supply America's pressing energy
needs."' In addition, other messages portrayed the oil company as caring
for and working to protect the ecology of the area where it was exploring
and drilling for oil. 9
"Id. at 808.
2Id. at 812.
9id. at 810.
84
1d. at 812.
-29 F.C.C.2d 807, 812 n.6 (1971).
-30 F.C.C.2d 643 (197 1). In a subsequent rehearing, the FCC affirmed its decision that
the advertisements raised controversial issues. But the Commission declined to take further
action since the network had shown that it was affording reasonable opportunity for the
contrasting viewpoints to be heard. Wilderness Society, 22 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1023
(1971).
8130 F.C.C.2d at 644.
uId. at 643. Complainants submitted transcripts of three advertisements; the first spoke
of the oil company's large investments and the remaining two indicated the company's
concern for ecology during exploration and drilling for oil in the Arctic.
8Id.

90
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The Commission thought that in light of the examples given in the
Chevron case,90 the advertisements directly raised the issues of the need
for quick development of the oil reserves in Alaska and the ecological
effects stemming from such development." It is noteworthy that the Commission stated that the advertisements also "inherently" raised a controversial issue, i.e., the ecological effects of the actual transportation of
the oil "since the company's large investment in drilling for Alaskan oil
quite obviously is based upon the assumption that transportation of the
2
oil to other parts of the world will be permitted.
IV.

Friends of the Earth

The refusal of the FCC to extend its cigarette ruling to product advertising in general13 received a substantial blow when the D.C. Circuit
reversed the Commission in Friendsof the Earth v. FCC.9 The complaint
to the Commission insisted that the advertising of high-test gasoline and
large-engine automobiles conveyed the message that such products were
"a requirement for the full rich life." 95 This message, it was claimed,
raised the specific issue of automotive pollution and whether in view of
this pollution the public should prefer unleaded gasoline and small-engine
cars. 96
In declining to apply the Banzhaf rationale, the FCC said that the
considerations in the cigarette ruling were distinguishable from those involving high-powered gasolines and cars. The Commission maintained
that the government was attempting for health reasons to dissuade the
public from smoking, whereas products which caused ecological problems
but also conferred substantial benefits involved a much more complex
balancing of competing interests." The real question in the cigarette ruling, according to the Commission, had been how such an unhealthful
product could have been "promoted at all on a medium impressed with
the public interest." However, no one was suggesting the abolition of
automobile advertisements. 9"
The D.C. Circuit rejected these distinctions, stating that it was unable
to see how the FCC could plausibly differentiate the gasoline and car
9

See text accompanying note 85 supra.
1130
F.C.C.2d at 646.
92
1d.
' 3See text accompanying note 72 supra.
9
Friends of the Earth v. FCC, no. 24,556 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 16, 1971).
"5Letter to Gary Soucie, 24 F.C.C.2d 743, 744 (1970).
"Id. at 744.
97
1d. at 746.
"Ild.
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situation from Banzhaf.9 The court pointed to the conclusion in Banzhaf
that cigarette advertisements portrayed smoking as socially desirable,
manly and an important part of a rich full life. 00° Likewise, the commercials at hand insinuated that the human personality found tremendous
fulfillment in a large car with a fast getaway."' The portrayal of such
products in the light of a thoroughly documented health hazard,," especially when Congress had taken action, 03 rendered the parallel with cigarette advertising and the relevance of Banzhafinescapable." °0
With regard to the FCC's effort to distinguish cigarette advertising
from the advertising at hand,"' the court concluded that the Commission
departed from its own precedent in Banzhaf
in insisting that, because cigarettes are unique in the threat they
present to human health, the public interest considerations which
caused it to reach the result it did in Banzhafhave no force here.
The distinction is not apparent to us, any more than we suppose
it is to the asthmatic in New York City for whom increasing air
pollution is a mortal danger."l6
V.

Military Recruitment-Selling the Army

The FCC has refused to find controversial issues requiring application
of the fairness doctrine in four military advertising cases: San Francisco
Women ior Peace,1 7 David C. Green,"' Alan F. Neckritz"' and Citizens

Communications Center."' In each of these cases, the complainant had
sought an FCC ruling declaring the licensee in violation of the fairness
doctrine for its refusal to broadcast messages opposing military service
and informing the public of alternatives to the draft."' The complainants
all argued that these messages were necessary since army recruitment
"Friends of the Earth v. FCC, no. 24,556 at 14 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 16, 1971).

13Id. at 11.
0
'Id. at 12.
'21d. at 4.
"'National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
"04No. 24,556 at 12 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 16, 1971).
" See text accompanying notes 97 & 98 supra.
lC6No. 24,556 at II (D.C. Cir. Aug. 16, 1971).
1-24 F.C.C.2d 156 (1970), af'dsub nom. Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
1-24 F.C.C.2d 171 (1970), affd sub nom. Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
t-24 F.C.C.2d 175 (1970), affd, 446 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1971).
11121
P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1222 (1971).
"'Citizens Communications Center, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1222 (1971); San Francisco Women For Peace, 24 F.C.C.2d 156 (1970); David C. Green, 24 F.C.C.2d 171 (1970);
Alan F. Neckritz, 24 F.C.C.2d 175 (1970).
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advertisements had raised the controversial issue of the desirability of
military service. "

2

In these cases the FCC and the courts on appeal concluded that no
controversial issues were inherent in the military advertisements."13 If any
issues did exist, they concerned American involvement in Vietnam,' the
draft" 5 or the morality of participating in any war."' But in any event
there had been no indication that the stations had failed to treat these
7
particular issues in conformance with the fairness doctrine.
Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, dissenting in San Francisco Women
for Peace, argued that the FCC's earlier cigarette ruling" 8 was definitely
applicable to the military recruitment announcements."' He maintained
that the advertisements had portrayed enlistment as desirable in terms of
the satisfactions to be derived from the experience of associating with
attractive people and "real" men.2 0 Furthermore, the reasons why volunteering might not be so desirable had not been presented, i.e., the hazard
22
2
of death and the legal alternatives ' to the draft other than enlistment.

"'Citizens Communications Center, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1222 (1971); San Francisco Women For Peace, 24 F.C.C.2d 156 (1970); David C. Green, 24 F.C.C.2d 171 (1970);
Alan F. Neckritz, 24 F.C.C.2d 175 (1970).
"3Neckritz v. FCC, 446 F.2d 501, 503 (9th Cir. 1971); Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323,
329-32 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Citizens Communications Center, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1222,
1223 (1971); San Francisco Women For Peace, 24 F.C.C.2d 156, 157 (1970); David C.
Green, 24 F.C.C.2d 171, 173 (1970); Alan F. Neckritz, 24 F.C.C.2d 175, 176 (1970).
"4Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
151d.
11Id. at 330-31.
"'Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1971); San Francisco Women For
Peace, 24 F.C.C.2d 156, 158 (1970); David C. Green, 24 F.C.C.2d 171, 173 (1970).
"'Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine to Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C.2d 921
(1967). All of the complainants relied on the cigarette ruling (the Banzhaf rationale). In
addition, the petitioners in Green relied on Local 880, Retail Store Employees v. FCC, 436
F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In this case the fairness doctrine issue arose in the context of a
labor dispute during which a broadcaster was regularly airing a department store's advertisements. The advertisements requested public patronage of the store and in response the labor
union sought to air announcements urging a boycott. Because the broadcast licensee refused
these announcements, the labor union attempted to block the renewal of his FCC license.
Although never really reaching the question of whether the fairness doctrine was applicable,
the court indicated that the store advertisements could have raised an "implicit" controversial issue. Id. at 258.
"'24 F.C.C.2d 156, 160-64 (1970).
"'Id.at 161.
'he sample announcements which petitioners in Green sought to broadcast attempted
to portray military service as highly undesirable. The announcements ended by emphasizing
that legal alternatives were available and giving phone numbers and addresses for further
free information. Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 325 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"'San Francisco Women For Peace, 24 F.C.C.2d 156, 166 (1970).
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With regard to the importance of congressional action to the holding
in Banzhaf,'2 Congress, of course, has not attempted to discourage the
public from serving in the military.lu Nevertheless, Commissioner Johnson emphasized that Congress in enacting the Selective Service Act had
exempted for strong national policy reasons persons in certain categories.'2 Since the goal of the fairness doctrine is the "promotion of informed decision-making by the public,"' 2 1 informing the public of these
exemptions would seem an appropriate task for the licensee to undertake.'2
The real question in the military advertising cases was whether or not
the recruiting advertisements had raised a controversial issue, i.e., legal
alternatives to military service other than volunteering or waiting to be
drafted.'2 The FCC did suggest in David C. Green that if the issue of the
draft had been raised, then the "controversial issue" of legal alternatives
would also have been raised. 12 ' But that ruling upheld as reasonable the
licensee's decision that-the draft issue had not been involved., In any
3
event, that issue was being afforded fair coverage.' '
The latter indication in these cases that the broadcaster was already
treating the issue fairly appears to be, as Commissioner Johnson pointed
out, a mere assumption unsupported by any evidence. 32 Perhaps more
importantly, it is unclear whether the supposed coverage of the draft
included the specific information the claimants sought to present'3 concerning the existence of alternatives. Furthermore, Commissioner Johnson suggests that the finding of a "reasonable" licensee decision'3 is a
meaningless appraisal.'3
'2See text accompanying notes 67-69, 78 supra.
2

1rhis
'
discussion should be compared with text accompanying note 97 supra.

IrSan Francisco Women For Peace, 24 F.C.C.2d 156, 166 (1970).
InGreen v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See Fairness Primer, 40 F.C.C.
598, 604 (1964); Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1247 (1949).

'1rhe complaints in the military advertising cases all insisted on the necessity of informing the public of the exemptions. See text accompanying note Ill supra.
'San Francisco Women For Peace, 24 F.C.C.2d 156, 157 (1970).
1'24 F.C.C.2d 171, 172 (1970).
1id. at 172-73.
'111d. at 173.
'"San Francisco Women For Peace, 24 F.C.C.2d 156, 167 (1970) (Johnson, Comm'r.,
dissenting).

'Note 121 supra.
''The FCC will not substitute its judgment for the reasonable judgment of the licensee
who acts in good faith. Fairness Primer, 40 F.C.C. 598, 599 (1964).
'124 F.C.C.2d at 162. Commissioner Johnson criticized the Commission's apparently
complete deference to licensee judgment:
Next, the majority drags out the customary and familiar boilerplate recita-
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BALANCED COVERAGE

It seems clear that there is great pressure urging an expansion of the
definition of a controversial issue to include issues inherent or implicit in
commercial advertising. Once the issue is recognized the fairness doctrine
requires balanced presentation of opposing viewpoints. 36 In view, then, of
the effect of commercial advertising on the definition of controversial
issues, the question remains whether such advertising has also had an
impact on the way the issues are to be given balanced coverage.
The Commission in Cigarette Advertising laid great stress on the
"repetitive and continuous" nature of cigarette commercials.' 37 It noted
further that frequency of the presentation of one side of an issue was
clearly a factor to be considered in the administration of the fairness
doctrine:
[W]hile the Fairness Doctrine does not contemplate "equal time,"
if the presentation of one side of the issue is on a regular continual
basis, fairness and the right of the public adequately to be informed
compels the conclusion that there must be some regularity in the
presentation of the other side of the issue. 38
The Commission stressed that though it was not usurping licensee judgment as to the type of programming or the amount or nature of time to
be afforded, the cigarette advertisements called for a significant allocation
of rebuttal time.
tion that the Commission will defer to the licensee's judgment on a Fairness Doctrine matter so long as it is "reasonable." ("In short, it is not a
question of the Commission substituting its judgment for that of the licensee, but rather whether, in light of the showing before the Commission, the
licensee's judgment can be said to be arbitrary.") Of course, everyone must
know that this double talk is nonsense, and is used primarily when the
Commission does not want to apply the Fairness Doctrine to a particular
factual situation. Obviously at some point this Commission must decide
that the licensee is wrong in his determination that the Fairness Doctrine
is inapplicable, and I do not see how we can do this unless we substitute
our judgment for the licensee's. Whatever may be the initial responsibility
of the licensee, some agency must arbitrate disputes regarding the applicability of the Fairness Doctrine-and that task has been assigned to the
Federal Communications Commission, with review by the courts. In any
case, the majority treats this "throwaway" language precisely for what it
is-a useless appendage inserted routinely in Commission opinions-and
proceeds to make its own, independent determination anyway. . ..
ImId. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
1179F.C.C.2d at 941.
138d.
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The court in Banzhaf, in a different context,'39 cited the "subliminal
impact" of advertising which it called a form of "pervasive propaganda"
capable of being heard even when not listened to:
In an age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely breathes a citizen
who does not know some part of a leading cigarette jingle by heart

... .[A]n ordinary habitual television watcher can avoid these
commercials only by frequently leaving the room, changing the
channel, or doing some other such affirmative act. 4 '
In all but one"' of the military advertising cases referred to above the
complainants specifically requested time to present spot advertisements to
rebut the military public service announcements.4 2 The answer to this
request was again that it was in the licensee's discretion to determine the
specific manner of complying with the fairness doctrine, and the Commission would "not dictate the form of the presentation--e.g., discussion or
panel shows, news shows, etc."'4 Nevertheless, the argument for spot
advertisements as articulated by the complainant in San Francisco
Women Jbr Peace seems appealing. The group wanted to argue its point
of view
through spot announcements rather than news and discussion
coverage because of the more effective motivating factors inherent
in an "uninterrupted" "prepackaged message" which "allows the
sponsor . . . to prepare the announcements in such a manner as
to have a desired psychological effect" rather than the "straightforward manner aimed at persuading the listener's rational sense"
which is the way views are presented on news and talk programs.'
3
"The court was stressing the differences between the newspaper press and the radio/TV
press which justified, in spite of the first amendment, more government control over the
latter than the former. 405 F.2d at 1099-1101.
"1405 F.2d at 1100.
"'Alan F. Neckritz, 24 F.C.C.2d 175 (1970). See text accompanying notes 107-10
supra.
"'The complainants actually sought free time to present their spot announcements. The
court never reached the question of free time since it held that no controversial issues had
been raised. For a summary of the FCC's position on the granting of free time in order to
satisfy fairness requirements, see note 48 supra.
"'David C. Green, 24 F.C.C.2d 171, 173 (1970). The Commission did indicate that the
stations had offered the complainants time to present their views in the context of regular
substantive programming. Id.
112d F.C.C.2d at 156-57. A good indication of the unusually powerful impact of spot
advertising as compared to normal news coverage is the success of such advertising. In a
letter to radio and TV presidents, Secretary of the Army Robert F. Froehlke reported that
response from a spring, 1971, TV-radio advertising campaign had been remarkable and that
approximately 8,000 enlistments could be attributed directly to the campaign with many
other volunteers having been influenced. BROADCASTING, Sept. 27, 197 1, at 43.
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Perhaps the most far-reaching recognition of the impact of advertising
as it relates to the fairness requirement of full coverage of controversial
issues is found in Business Executives' Move jor Vietnam Peace v. FCC.'
This case reversed two FCC decisions'4 which had permitted a broadcast
licensee policy of refusing to sell advertising time to groups or individuals
wishing to speak out on controversial issues." 7 The court held only that
where some commercial advertising time was sold, a total ban on editorial
advertising was in violation of the first amendment. It did not require that
the stations accept the specific editorial advertisements in question,'48 but
remanded the case with instructions to the Commission that it develop
reasonable regulatory guidelines' 49 to deal with such questions as what and
how many groups or individuals should be given or sold what broadcast
time.
Although it is beyond the scope of this note to examine in detail what
has been referred to as this underlying constitutional right of access to the
mass media, 50 it is worthwhile to note certain considerations which led
to the conclusion in Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace. In its
analysis, the court quoted from Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC: "[i]t
is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas [in the broadcast media]."''5 According to the court
it followed that the goal of an informed public5 2 was not the only first
amendment interest constraining broadcasters, 5 3 since the interest of individuals and groups in effective "self-expression" was perhaps more important.' 54 This "self-expression" interest is related to the more specific
first amendment interest in editorial advertising through the control ex"'Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, no. 24,492 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
3, 1971).
'Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242 (1970); Democratic
National Committee, 25 F.C.C.2d 216 (1970).
4
Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, no. 24,492 at 3 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 3, 1971).
'"Id. at 4.
'"Id.

'See Johnson &Westen, A Twentieth-CenturySoapbox: The Right to Purchase Radio
and Television Time. 57 VA. L. Rav. 574 (1971); Note, A Fair Break for Controversial
Speakers: Limitationsof the FairnessDoctrineand the Need for IndividualAccess, 39 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 532 (1971); Note, Free Speech and the Mass Media, 57 VA. L. REv. 636
(1971).
'Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, no. 24,492 at 22 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 3, 1971).
'5See text accompanying note 126 supra.
'Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, no. 24,492 at 22 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 3, 1971).
"'Id.at 23.
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erted by broadcasters over controversial issue programming."' While the
advertiser generally controls and edits a paid advertisement, the broadcaster's editing of regular news programs often decides what is emphasized and what is minimized. 56 With this in mind, the court concluded that
"[e]ditorial advertising is

. .

.a special and separate mode of expression,

not simply a duplication of other expression on the same medium."'' 57
A further argument was presented that in airing an issue such as war,
the fact that antiwar views had been presented on news and interview
shows did not mean that a particular antiwar editorial advertisement
55
would add nothing to the public's information and understanding.
Much could be gained through individual self-expression in which matters
of style and intensity of feeling were important components. 55
In making these suggestions the court was aware that short editorial
announcements could be misleading:
[T]he onesidedness and private editing of particular "spot" editorial advertisements may in the end steer viewers and listeners
away from the "truth" by distorting complex issues. .

.

.But that

does not mean that they are unprotected by the First Amendment.
Our Constitution protects many forms of misleading and overly
simplified political expression in order to ensure robust, wide-open
debate ...
We conclude, therefore, that the fairness doctrine's goal of full
and fair coverage of issues on normal programming time does not
eliminate the public's interest in a further, complementary airing
of controversial views during advertising time.'
CONCLUSION

Despite the reluctance of the FCC to extend the applicability of the
fairness doctrine to advertising, it appears that commercial advertisements of products other than cigarettes can raise controversial issues of
public importance. Such was the view adopted in Friends of the Earth.,"
In addition, the characteristics of advertising may be such that when a
product commercial is seen as raising one side of an issue, balanced
' Id. at 24.
1 8Id.
157 d.
'Old. at 27.
1111d. at 28.
'1Id.at 28-29.
"'INo. 24,556 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 16, 1971). See also Local 880, Retail Store Employees
v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Avco Broadcasting Corp., 23 P & F RADIO REG.
2D I11(1971).
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coverage of the other side may require more than the normal panel and
news shows. Spot editorial advertisements might be needed to balance the
repetitive impact6 2 and psychological effect163 of controversial product
advertisements. This was the basic approach taken in Cigarette
Advertising 4 and appears to be strongly supported by Business Executives' Move jbr Vietnam Peace. In that case, although the court was
dealing specifically with a constitutional right of access to the media,6 5
the court seems to have suggested that editorial advertisements might be
necessary to the balanced presentation of opposing views.' This requirement would preserve the first amendment goals of "an uninhibited marketplace of ideas"' 67 and a robust and wide-open debate within the broadcast media. 68
The difficulties involved in reconciling the fairness doctrine with advertising appear to be immense. For example, the list of products which
suggest controversial issues appears endless, e.g., fluoride toothpaste,
drugs, detergents, and beer. 6 9 An extreme attempt to invoke application
of the doctrine is exemplified by the argument before the FCC of Joseph
N. Onek in behalf of the National Welfare Rights Organization and the
Sierra Club.7 0 He contended that the fairness doctrine should apply to
the entire TV advertising system in order to allow a rebuttal to advertising's encouragement of increased personal spending. The opposing side
would encourage greater expenditures for public services. The example
" See text accompanying note 70 supra.
' 3See text accompanying notes 139-40, 144 supra.
'The Commission in Cigarette Advertising did stress that it was not compelling a
licensee to treat the issue of smoking through spot messages. Again the emphasis was on a
significant amount of time to present the anti-smoking viewpoint to rebut the numerous
smoking commercials. 9 F.C.C2d at 941-42. But the Commission did point with favor to
the availability of such anti-smoking commercials and to the use already being made of them
by some licensees. 9 F.C.C.2d at 941 n.24.
"'No. 24,492 at 10-Il (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 1971).
'With such an overwhelming recognition of the value and impact of spot advertising,
it seems arguable that no licensee could reasonably conclude that issues raised in advertising
could be balanced with regular panel shows and discussions. Compare the contrasting
viewpoints of FCC Chairman Dean Burch and Commissioner Nicholas Johnson on the
question of spot advertisements and balanced coverage in Wilderness Society, 22 P & F
RADIO REG. 2D 1023, 1029-37 (1971).
"Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
ssBusiness Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, no. 24,492 at 28-29 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 3, 1971).
'Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine to Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 94243 (1967), affd sub non. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 842 (1969).
'7 Raspberry, Public Interest TV Ads?, Washington Post, Oct. 15, 1971, at A23, col.
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given was that if advertisers urge a man to spend money for a new car,
money to feed
others should be allowed to encourage him to spend7 more
1
the hungry, educate the ignorant and stop pollution.'
Broadcasters are concerned that the extension of the fairness doctrine
to product advertising is just another example of unwanted government
regulation. 7 2 In addition, they contend that it would mean tremendous
revenue loss from advertisers. John A. Schneider, president of CBS
Broadcast Group, remarked in a recent speech that he could think of no
sales presentation or discount price which could convince an advertiser to
make use of broadcasting if the advertiser were doomed to watch counteradvertisements, advising that his product was unsafe, injurious to health
or endangering the environment. 73 With regard to increased government
regulation, it should be remembered that failure to comply with the fairness doctrine, which really means failure to7 5 operate in the public interest, 174 can jeopardize a broadcaster's license.1
The problems the FCC faces with respect to the fairness doctrine in
general, as well as those involving the doctrine's relationship to advertising, are overripe for resolution. It appears that the FCC has persisted too
long in applying vague criteria in an attempt to ensure fairness. Whether
Congress will resolve the issues through legislation 76 or the FCC through
new regulations is unclear at this moment. The Commission has in fact
efficacy of the fairness docinitiated "a broad-ranging inquiry into the
177
trine" which at this writing has just begun.
17ld.

172See text accompanying note 17 supra.
171BROADCASTING, Oct. 25, 1971, at 42.
174See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
175Broadcasting licenses are granted by the FCC for three years. Upon expiration of a
license and "upon application therefor, a renewal of such license may be granted. . . if the
Commission finds that public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served thereby."
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1970). It has been held that members
of the public in general have standing as parties in interest to contest renewal of these
licenses. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.
Cir. 1966). Thus a number of special interest groups have successfully blocked the license
renewals on such grounds as oppressive overcommercialization by advertising announcements, racial discrimination and violation of the fairness doctrine. For an interesting discussion of this problem as the broadcaster views it, see BROADCASTING, Sept. 20, 1971, at 36;
BROADCASTING, Sept. 27, 1971, at 24.
76
' Richard Barron, president of the North Carolina Association of Broadcasters, urged
legislative repeal of the fairness doctrine in his testimony before Senator Sam Erwin's
Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. BROADCASTING, Oct. 25, 197 1,at 47.
'The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest
Standards of the Communications Act, Notice of Inquiry, 30 F.C.C.2d 26 (1971). See
Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.2d 27 (1970).

